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LEGISLATION
DEFAMATION BY RADIO AND TELEVISION-RECENT ADDITION TO THE
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
Introduction
In April of this year, the New York Legislature enacted an
amendment to the Civil Practice Act' pertaining to defamation by
radio and television. It provides, generally, that station owners are
relieved of liability in cases where a political candidate utters defama-
tory remarks in the course of a political speech.2 This legislation is
not an isolated enactment, but part of a general trend throughout the
nation.3 A full understanding of the reasons underlying the passage
of these statutes, and the effect which they have on existing law, re-
quires an examination of the history of the law of defamation as it
relates to broadcasting.4
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934
In 1927 Congress passed the Radio Act 5 which provided, in
part, that a radio station, once having granted broadcast time to a
political candidate, must allow an equal amount of time to his oppo-
nent. It also stipulated that a station owner could not censor a
political speech. These provisions were later reenacted as Section
315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.6 This act was first
construed in Sorensen v. Wood,7 wherein a candidate for state attor-
ney general brought an action against Wood and the radio station as
"N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 337-a.
2 "The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting
station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner,
licensee or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio
broadcast, by any legally qualified candidate for public office whose utterances,
under rules and regulations of the federal communications commission may not
be subject to censorship by such owner, licensee or operator of such visual or
sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, or their agents or
employees." Id. § 337-a(I).
' See notes 32 and 34 infra.
4 For a comprehensive history of the law of radio, see Snyder, Liability Of
Station Owners For Defamatory Statements Made By Political Candidates,
39 VA. L. Rav. 303 (1953).
5 44 STAT. 1170 (1927).
648 STAT. 1088 (1934), later amended by 66 STAT. 717, 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1952). "(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power
of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate." Ibid.
7 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
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parties defendant, alleging that he had been defamed in the course
of a political broadcast. The station owner, by way of defense, stated
that under Section 315 of the act the station did not have the right
to censor a political speech and, consequently, could not be liable for
any defamation in the course of that speech. Nevertheless, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held the station strictly liable, construing
Section 315 to mean that a station could censor any part of the speech
which did not have a political or partisan meaning. It reasoned that
this situation was analogous to the defamation cases in which news-
papers were held strictly liable, adding that Section 315 did not grant
a radio station license to publish libel.8 A similar line of reasoning
was employed in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.,9 in which a
station was held liable for defamatory remarks emanating from New
York and transmitted over an entire network of which the defendant
was a part. The station had no control over the transmission of the
particular broadcast and no means of knowing in advance that a
defamatory remark would be made.10 The Missouri court applied the
strict liability rule, suggesting that the station insure itself against
defamation to cover situations such as this."
The strict liability principle, however, has not been universally
followed. Other states, including New York, merely imposed a duty
of due care on the radio station.12 In the leading case of Summit
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,13 the defendant leased its
facilities to a sponsor and approved the script in advance of the pro-
gram. In the course of the broadcast, an entertainer "ad libbed" a
defamatory remark concerning plaintiff's hotel. The Pennsylvania
court decided in favor of the defendant, reasoning that it was not liable
for the defamation since it exercised due care. The court refused to
8 "There can be and is little dispute that the written words charged and
published constitute libel rather than slander." Sorensen v. Wood, su.pra note 7,
243 N.W. at 85. There is a conflict as to whether defamation by radio is libel
or slander. See Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. N.Y. 1949)
(slander when not read from script); Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296,
73 N.E2d 30 (1947) (libel when read from script).
98 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934). See Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc.,
172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
10 See Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., supra note 9; Testimony of
W. Theodore Pierson, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Investigate the
Federal Communications Commission of the House of Representatives, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 38 (1948).
"i This suggestion, it is submitted, has no merit. It is unreasonable that a
person should be forced to provide against the commission of an inten-
tional tort over which he has no control. This would be the broadcasters'
position if the advice were followed; and it would be the result of being held
liable for a tort, the commission of which he is legally incapable of preventing.
12 See, e.g., Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787,
38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d
143 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948) ; Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
13 Supra note 12.
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accept the newspaper analogy adopted in the Sorensen case,14 stating
that no comparison could be made between the two mediums. One
basis advanced for this view was that extensive control is exercised
over the broadcasting industry by the Federal Government, 15 while
the newspaper industry has a maximum amount of freedom.' 6  New
York applied the due care standard in Josephson v. Knickerbocker
Broadcasting Co.y'7 a case involving defamation in the course of a
political broadcast. There the defendant contended that Section 315
prohibited censorship; therefore, the station should be given a qualified
privilege against liability. In addition, it was alleged that due care
had been exercised inasmuch as the script had been examined before
the broadcast.18 The court agreed with the position taken by the
defendant and refused to impose strict liability.
The Port Huron Case
In 1948, the defamation problem facing the broadcasting industry
was further complicated by the decision handed down in the Port
Huron case.' 9 The Port Huron Broadcasting Company had agreed
to make time available to three candidates for political office. Upon
examining the scripts submitted, the station found that one contained
defamatory material. The station owner cancelled all three broad-
casts; whereupon tvo of the candidates submitted complaints to the
FCC. The Commission decided to conduct a hearing upon the sta-
tion's application for renewal of its license 20 The station requested
that the FCC reconsider and grant the license without a hearing.
The Commission consented, stating that it did so only because the
law was in such an unsettled state. It then proceeded to attempt to
'1 Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
15For regulations covering commercial broadcasting, see Title 47 U.S.C.;
MILLER, Reappraisal of the Federal Communications Commission's Policies
Regarding Issuance of Broadcast Licenses, in CoMmuNicATIoNs MEDIA LEGAL
AND POLICY PRonLEms 206 (1954).
16 There is no stringent control of the newspaper industry by any federal
agency. In this sense it cannot be compared with the broadcasting industry.
See Kelly v. Hoffman, supra note 12. For a discussion of the publication of
libel by newspapers, see Note, 28 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 247 (1954).
17 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
18 It was common practice, before any legislation on the subject, for the
broadcasters to examine the political speech prior to the broadcast. They would
have their attorneys go over it very carefully for defamatory matter and have
them write an opinion on it. They would then confer with the political candi-
date, indicating to him any possibly defamatory material. The candidate would
usually agree to its being deleted. In this manner the situation was adequately
handled. See Testimony of Don Petty, Hearings Before the Select Committee
to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission of the House of Rep-
resentatives, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1948).19 In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
20 Under the statute, every station must have its license renewed once every
three years. See 66 STAT. 714, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1952).
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clarify the confusion surrounding the application of Section 315. The
Commission called for strict compliance with the censorship clause
of that section, declaring that:
. . . [W]e are of the opinion that the prohibition of section 315 against any
censorship by licensees of political speeches by candidates for office is absolute,
and no exception exists in the case of material which is either libelous or might
tend to involve the station in an action for damages.21
It also expressed the opinion that Congress had preempted the field
of radio defamation by the enactment of Section 315, and had in-
tended to give immunity to the broadcaster. It was asserted that
once a station enters the field of political broadcasting and extends
time to a candidate, it may not withdraw. This opinion has been
greatly criticized.22  It is almost impossible for a modern station to
stay out of this area of broadcasting. 23 Moreover, this stand of the
FCC apparently nullified the provision of Section 315 which states
that a station need not allow any candidate broadcast time.2 4
In Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.,25 the court ap-
peared to agree with the commission's interpretation of the censorship
provision, indicating that the prohibition is absolute. However, in an
action to annul the FCC's order in the Port Huron decision, the court,
in Houston Post Co. v. United States,26 refused to give any weight
to the commission's opinion. In dismissing the action for lack of
jurisdiction, it stated that the Port Huron decision was merely an
opinion and not an order of the FCC. In 1952, the FCC re-emphasized
the stand it had taken in the Port Huron decision and unequivocally
stated that the prohibition against censorship in Section 315 is abso-
lute. Further, they warned that no violation of this section would
be tolerated. 27  Whether or not the state courts will follow this in-
terpretation, in view of prior decisions, is purely conjectural.
As a result of these conflicting opinions, the broadcasting in-
dustry found itself on the horns of a dilemma. If the stations failed
to comply with Section 315, they ran the risk of losing their licenses.
If they did comply and an action for defamation ensued, they were
at the mercy of the state courts and their interpretation of Section
315. Furthermore, as previously stated, the Port Huron case indi-
21 See In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), supra note 19 at 1074.
22 See Testimony of Don Petty, Hearings, supra note 18, at 66; Snyder,
Liability Of Station Owners For Defamatory Statements Made By Political
Candidates, 39 VA. L. Rzv. 303, 308-09 (1953).
23 See Snyder, supra note 22, at 307.
24 See note 6 supra.
25 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
26 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
27 See Snyder, Liability Of Station Owners For Defamatory Statements
Made By Political Candidates, 39 VA. L. REv. 303, 312 (1953).
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cated that a station, once having entered the field of political broad-
casting, could not thereafter withdraw. 28
State Legislation
Since congressional relief was not forthcoming,29 the states found
it necessary to enact remedial legislation. The statutory relief af-
forded broadcasters falls into one of two general categories. The
Georgia statute is representative of those statutes which completely
absolve the station owners from liability.30 It provides that:
In no event . . . shall any owner, licensee or operator or the agents or
employees of any such owner, licensee or operator of such a station or network
of stations be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered
over the facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of any candidate
for public office.3 1
There are presently twenty-six of these statutes in effect throughout
the nation. 2 All are similar to a model statute proposed by the
National Association of Broadcasters 33 and considerably ease the
burden of the broadcasting industry.
2 8 In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), 12 F.C.C. 1069, 1071
(1948) (dictum) ; see Snyder, supra note 27, at 308.
29 Brief for the National Association of Broadcasters as Amicus Curiae,
Hearings Before the Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communica-
tions Commission of the House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 57-60 (1948).
3D For a list of the statutes which completely absolve station owners from
liability, see note 32 infra.
31 GA. CODE ANN. tit. 105, § 105-713 (Supp. 1951).3 2 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 27-2007 (Supp. 1954); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1606
(Supp. 1953); CAL. Civ. CODE § 48.5(3) (1954); COLO. REv. STAT. c. 41-2-6
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §770.04 (Supp. 1954); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 105,§ 105-713 (Supp. 1951); IDAHO CODE tit. 6, § 6-701 (Supp. 1955); ILL. Rv.
STAT. c. 38, § 404.2(b) (1951) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-746a (Supp. 1953);
LA. REv. STAT. tit. 45, § 1352 (Supp. 1954) ; ME. Ray. STAT. c. 130, § 32 (1954);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1406 (Supp. 1953); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1059.5(2)
(Supp. 1954); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.105 (Vernon, 1953); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 86-602 (1950) ; NEv. STAT. c. 230 (1951) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-35 (Supp.
1955) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 14-0209 (Supp. 1953) ; OHIO Rzv. CODE ANN. tit. 27,§ 2739.03(A) (Baldwin, Supp. 1955) ; ORE. REv. STAT. c. 30, § 30.760(2) (1953) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1585 (Purdon, Supp. 1954) ; S.C. CODE tit. 23, § 23-7
(Supp. 1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-5 (Supp. 1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 8-632.1 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5482(1) (Michie, 1955); Wyo. Comp,.
STAT. ANN. § 3-8204 (Supp. 1955).
33 See Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends In Defamation By Radio, 64
Hagv. L. REv. 727 (1951). Many of the states have patterned their statutes
after the suggested National Association of Broadcasters' statute. "Section 2.
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or operator, or the agents or
employees . . . of such a station or network of stations be held liable for any
damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such sta-
tion or network by or on behalf of any candidate for public office." Id. at 741,
n.71.
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The second class of statutes absolve the station owners from
liability only in the event that they exercise due care in attempting
to prevent the defamatory publication.3 4  An example of this type
of legislation is the Texas statute which provides that:
The owners, licensees . . . shall not be liable for any damages for any
defamatory statement ...unless it shall be alleged and proved by the com-
plaining party, that such owner . . .has failed to exercise due care to prevent
the publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast.35
Notwithstanding the small amount of litigation on this particular
subject, many of the states enacted remedial legislation subsequent to
the decision in the Port Huron case.86 That decision and the con-
troversy this subject has caused in recent years,3 7 in all probability,
led to the passage of many of the aforementioned statutes.
The majority are, of necessity, very broadly worded for they
sweepingly absolve station owners from liability.38 A serious ques-
tion may arise as to whether the station owner is exempt from lia-
bility where a representative of the candidate makes the broadcast.3 9
There are no cases in the state courts which consider this problem.
There is, however, one case in the federal courts. In Felix v. West-
inghouse Radio Stations, Inc.,40 a defamatory statement was broad-
cast by the representative of a political candidate. The court held
that the censorship clause in Section 315 did not apply to the repre-
sentative. Since the case was tried in Pennsylvania, the defendant
radio station, permitted to censor the speech under the court's ruling,
would be held to a duty of due care under the rule of the Summit Hotel
case.41  If other states follow the Westinghouse case, the station
owner who permits a candidate's representative to speak will not be
protected under many of the statutes.
42
31 The following statutes impose a duty of due care: IowA CODE ANN.
c. 659, § 659.5 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99-5 (Michie, 1950); S.D.
CODE c. 47.05, § 47.0506 (Supp. 1952) ; TEX. STAT. art. 5433a (Vernon, Supp.
1953) ; cf. MD. CODE ANN. art. 75, § 19A (Flack, 1951) ; MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 544.043 (Supp. 1954) ; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 64-205 (1947) ; WASH. REv.
CODE tit. 19, § 19.64.010 (1943).
35 TFrx. STAT. art. 5433a (Vernon, Supp. 1953).
36 See notes 32 and 34 supra. Only 9 states had enacted remedial legislation
prior to the Port Huron decision. See Snyder, Liability Of Station Owners
For Defamatory Statements Made By Political Candidates, 39 VA. L. REV. 303,
314 n.56 (1953).
37 See WITrENBERG, DANGEROUS WoRDs 265-81 (1948) ; Hearings Before the
Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission of the
House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 1-109 (1948).
38 See note 33 supra.
39 See note 42 infra.
40 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
41Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302
(1939).
42 The Arkansas statute serves as an example of a statute not specifically
covering this situation. "Neither the owner, licensee, or operator of a visual
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations nor his agents or
[ VOL. 30
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The statutes which set up a standard of due care 43 pose another
problem. The concept of due care, in this context, usually means
taking all possible precautions to prevent defamation. This standard,
however, is of no real value in dealing with defamation in this par-
ticular area. Due care cannot be exercised under Section 315, since
the prohibition against censorship is absolute if the Port Huron case
is followed, 44 and all the due care possible cannot prevent defamation
where the owner is not empowered to delete defamatory matter. Of
the thirty-five states which have enacted remedial legislation 45 only
eight do not absolve the owner completely.46 Three states have
amended their due care statutes to provide absolute immunity. 47 The
only effective statute would be one completely absolving the station
owner from liability upon proof that the federal statute and regula-
tions had been complied with.
48
The New York Statute
Prior to the recent enactment,49 New York applied the same
due care concept as was set down in Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co.50 The new statute, on the other hand, completely
absolves the station owner from liability where the utterances of
"1... any legally qualified candidate... under rules and regulations
of the federal communications commission may not be subject to
censorship by such owner. . .".. This immunity, however, is con-
employees shall be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement pub-
lished or uttered in, or as a part of, a visual or sound broadcast by a candidatefor political office in those instances in which, under the acts of Congress or
the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, the
broadcasting station or network is prohibited from censoring the script of the
broadcast." AR. STAT. ANN. § 3-1606 (Supp. 1953) (emphasis added).
43 See note 34 supra.
44 The Port Huron decision, although no more than the mere opinion of the
FCC, is adhered to by the broadcasters. The prohibition against censorship is
absolute, and mere opinion or not, the stations will follow it. See Hearings
Before the Select Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Com-
mission of the House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79
(1948).
45 See notes 1, 32 and 34 supra.
46 See note 34 supra.
47 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.04 (Supp. 1954) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-746a
(Supp. 1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-5 (Supp. 1955).
48 A statute somewhat like this proposed statute, has been enacted in Florida.
"The owner, licensee, or operator of a radio or television broadcasting station
... shall not be liable ... unless it shall be alleged and proved by the com-
plaining party, that such owner . . . has failed to exercise due care .. .
provided, however, the exercise of due care shall be construed to include the
boa fide compliance with any federal law or the regulation of any federal
regulatory agency." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.04 (Supp. 1954) (emphasis added).
49 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 337-a.
50 336 Pa. 182, 8 A2d 302 (1939). See Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broad-
casting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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tingent upon the station's announcing, before and after each political
broadcast, that the views expressed in the program are not neces-
sarily those of the station, and that the remarks are not subject to
censorship.
Although the statute contains a detailed and specific definition
of the term "legally qualified candidate," r" no mention is made of
the representative of a candidate. Accordingly, it would appear that
speeches made by such persons do not come within the scope of the
statute. If this is so, and if New York follows the rule in the
Westinghouse case, 52 the station owner would not be protected. A
second and more serious problem will arise if New York courts re-
fuse to follow the FCC's interpretation of the censorship clause of
Section 315. As previously stated, it has been construed by the
Commission as being an absolute prohibition. If the New York
courts concur in this opinion, the new statute will completely absolve
broadcasters from liability. If, on the other hand, the courts adopt
the reasoning that the prohibition against censorship is not absolute, 53
and construe it as allowing censorship of defamatory matter, the New
York statute will be rendered completely ineffective. The broad-
casters, under such an interpretation, would be placed back in the
dilemma they faced prior to the remedial statute's passage, i.e., they
will have to choose between loss of license for an FCC violation and
the possibility of being sued for defamation.
Conclusion
The necessity for legislation in this field is obvious, considering
the precarious position in which Section 315 places station owners.
In the absence of congressional action, state legislation appears to be
the only solution. Indeed, the propriety of any congressional action
in the first instance would be open to question. 54 The New York
51 "2. A 'legally qualified candidate' means any person who has publicly
announced that he is a candidate for nomination by a convention of a political
party or for nomination or election in a primary, special, or general election,
municipal, county, state or national, and who meets the qualifications prescribed
by the applicable laws to hold the office for which he is a candidate, so that
he may be voted for by the electorate directly or by means of delegates or
electors and who (a) has qualified for a place on the ballot or (b) is eligible
under the applicable law to be voted by writing in his name on the ballot, or
other method and who has been nominated by a political party which is com-
monly known and regarded as such or makes a substantial showing that he is
a bona fide candidate for nomination or office, as the case may be." N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT § 337-a.
52 Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
53 Section 315 was construed in Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co.,
supra note 50, wherein the court clearly regarded it as completely prohibiting
censorship.
54 It would seem that there is a valid objection on the ground that, where
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statute will prove adequate if the courts agree with the FCC on the
question of the stations' right to censor political speeches. If they
disagree, the statute should be amended to give the broadcaster un-
conditional immunity for defamation in the course of a political
broadcast.15
not absolutely necessary, federal control should not be further extended. See
VANDERBILT, THE DocrRiNE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-
DAY SIGNIFICANCE 53-95 (1953). It is suggested, as possibly a better solution,
that a uniform code be formulated similar to the Uniform Commercial Code.
In this way control of the field of libel and slander would be left in the hands
of the states.
55 Within the past year, two bills were introduced in Congress pertaining to
defamation by a political candidate. Senator Butler of Maryland proposed an
amendment to Section 315 which would prohibit liability from being imposed
on licensees, because of defamation in the course of a political speech, unless
the licensee had actual intent to defame [S. 1208, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955)
in 101 CONG. REc. 1752 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1955)]. A similar bill was intro-
duced in the House by Representative Miller of Maryland [H.R. 4814, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) in 101 CoNG. REc. 2244 (daily ed. March 10, 1955)].
In addition, a bill was introduced by Senator Payne of Maine which would
exclude appearances by candidates on panel shows, news documentaries, debates
and similar type programs from the equal time requirement of Section 315
[S. 2306, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) in 101 CoNG. REc. 7813 (daily ed. June
24, 1955)].
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